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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, a person may apply for asylum if the person 
meets the statutory definition of a “refugee.”1 Asylum status grants 
“withholding of removal”2 from the United States, as well as an 
eventual path to lawful permanent residence.3 Although asylum is 
rooted in international humanitarian prerogatives, United States 
requirements are stringent due to national security concerns.4 But 
while those concerns may debatably justify tougher laws for the sake 
of screening out meritless or fraudulent asylum claims, there are some 
aspects of asylum law that unduly prejudice many deserving 
applicants. 
For instance, consider the case of “Alex,” who fled a South 
American country because he feared that he would be killed due to 
his political beliefs.5 After Alex unsuccessfully attempted to enter the 
United States, he was detained at the border and then interviewed by 
an immigration officer. Alex explained the circumstances that caused 
him to flee and seek asylum, and the interviewing officer noted that 
Alex had a credible fear of persecution if he were to return to his 
home country. The officer then gave Alex a Notice to Appear for a 
hearing, that stated that the date and time of the hearing were to be 
determined. In theory, Alex would later receive a “Notice of 
Hearing” indicating the date and time.6 But, the United States 
 
 *  © 2017 Roy Xiao. 
 1. 8 U.S.C. §	1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 2. Withholding of removal is effectively a stay on deportation proceedings. 
 3. People that are present in the United States unlawfully are subject to removal 
(deportation). A grant of asylum stalls or prevents that removal process from occurring. 
See Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian
/refugees-asylum/asylum [https://perma.cc/8LS7-E8YB] (last updated Aug. 6, 2015). 
 4. Swetha Sridharan, Material Support to Terrorism—Consequences for Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www
.migrationpolicy.org/article/material-support-terrorism-%E2%80%94-consequences-
refugees-and-asylum-seekers-united-states [https://perma.cc/8Q4S-KPJA]. 
 5. “Alex” is an individual I represented while working for the Immigration Clinic at 
the University of North Carolina School of Law. The client’s name has been changed for 
his protection. For more information about the clinic, see Immigration Clinic, UNC SCH. 
OF LAW, www.law.unc.edu/academics/clinic/immigration [https://perma.cc/PCN8-B8AY]. 
 6. §	1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 69 (2016), https://www
95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) never docketed the 
case with the proper immigration court, and consequently, Alex never 
received a Notice of Hearing.7 
In these specific circumstances, it was technically impossible for 
Alex to comply with a particular provision of the asylum statute that 
requires asylum applications to be “filed” within one year of arriving 
in the United States.8 This one-year requirement (often referred to as 
the “one-year bar”) frustrates valid asylum claims because 
applications are not considered filed until an immigration judge 
receives them in open court.9 Alex and others like him have no way of 
complying with the requirement because they never have the 
opportunity to appear in immigration court since their hearings are 
never scheduled. And in cases where a hearing is scheduled, it may be 
set for a date that occurs after the one-year deadline. These two 
unfair practices are so pervasive that the American Immigration 
Council issued a practice advisory with strategies for 
circumnavigating the one-year filing deadline.10 In short, because of 
the one-year deadline, many asylum applicants face a challenge.  
Should an immigration judge determine that Alex’s application 
was not filed within a year of his arrival, this administrative decision 
cannot easily be reviewed by federal courts.11 While the one-year 
filing requirement can be waived by an immigration judge, such 
waivers are inequitably awarded.12 Furthermore, an appeal is time 
consuming and expensive, a serious concern since applicants like Alex 
 
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-08-2016
_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/74F2-BBSM]. 
 7. For information regarding this interview, contact the author. 
 8. §	1158(a)(2)(B). This Recent Development will refer to this requirement as the 
“one-year bar” or “one-year deadline.” 
 9. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 6, at 35. 
 10. See generally id. (providing immigration attorneys with information about and 
strategies for complying with the one-year filing deadline). In addition, on June 30, 2016, 
the Northwest Immigration Rights Project filed a class action complaint in an attempt to 
remedy how the one-year deadline interacts with Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) and USCIS operating procedures to produce unfair outcomes for applicants. See 
Complaint—Class Action for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Mandamus at 1, 
Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, No. 2:16-cv-01024 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2016), www.nipnlg.org
/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/2016_30Jun_rojas-v-johnson.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGB6-KGHS].  
 11. See Hana v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 39, 40, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting the Board of 
Immigration Appeals did not find a clear error with regard to the immigration judge’s 
factual finding that the applicant, Hana, did not file his asylum application within a year 
and explaining that the First Circuit “do[es] not have jurisdiction to review the agency’s 
findings regarding timeliness or its application of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
exception	.	.	.	unless an alien identifies a legal or constitutional defect in the decision”). 
 12. See infra Section III.A. 
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have no legal means of employment.13 However, there is a potential 
solution: if the illegal entrant asylum applicant is found to have a 
credible fear during their removal hearing (as Alex did), the 
application could be constructively filed for the purposes of the one-
year filing deadline. This type of constructive filing is known as 
“lodging,” and there is precedent for the practice, as the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) already allows lodging 
applications in at least one other context.14 
This Recent Development argues that when an immigration 
officer determines that an illegal entrant asylum applicant has a 
credible fear of persecution during the initial removal hearing, that 
finding should “lodge” the application for purposes of the one-year 
filing deadline. Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I further 
describes Alex’s case and addresses how similarly situated applicants 
can fall through the cracks of the asylum process. Part II provides an 
overview of United States asylum law and the three types of asylum 
applications. Part III reviews the statutory bars to asylum, and Part 
IV details immigration office practices that make it difficult for illegal 
entrant asylum applicants to file their applications and receive notice 
about their hearing dates. Finally, Part V argues that a finding of 
credible fear in an initial removal hearing should lodge defensive 
asylum applications. It also recommends other changes in the law that 
could reduce the number of refugees who are deported.  
I.  THE ILLEGAL ENTRANT’S PLIGHT 
Alex came from a country that recently experienced political 
upheaval. A new government assumed power and immediately 
instituted a number of troubling changes, including restrictions on the 
media and forms of public protest. Prior to the upheaval, Alex was 
intimately involved with the opposition party and frequently 
protested for issues he felt were important. He also directed and 
acted in plays that satirized government policies and were performed 
in public areas. After the country’s leadership changed, Alex 
continued speaking out, but his form of protest was not well received 
by the ruling party, notorious for their association with violent 
criminal organizations. Alex later received a death threat. Fearing for 
his own safety and for the lives of his wife and children, he fled his 
 
 13. Non-citizens must have authorization to work in the United States legally. 
Working in the US, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-
united-states/working-us [https://perma.cc/893C-DSC5] (last updated Sept. 11, 2013). 
However, an asylee can work in the United States immediately. See Asylum, supra note 3. 
 14. See infra Section V.D. 
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home country by himself for a place that he thought would be a safe 
haven—the United States of America. 
After Alex crossed the border into the United States “without 
inspection,” he was detained, arraigned, and subjected to removal 
proceedings,15 the formal procedures that precede deportation.16 
Specifically, because Alex attempted to circumvent inspection at the 
border, he was characterized as an illegal entrant making him subject 
to a fast-track deportation system known as “expedited removal.”17 
These expedited proceedings offer fewer procedural safeguards to 
detainees.18 
When Alex told the immigration officer why he had to leave his 
country, the officer in charge of his case noted that Alex had a 
plausible asylum claim. The officer then referred Alex for a 
preliminary interview known as a “credible fear interview” to make a 
further determination on the validity of his asylum case.19 After the 
interview, the officer determined that Alex had a credible fear of 
persecution if he were to be returned to his home country. He was 
then given a “Notice to Appear” before an immigration judge for a 
full asylum determination. However, the time and place of that 
hearing were marked as “TBD” on the Notice to Appear, and he was 
instructed to check his mail for a Notice of Hearing, which would 
state the time and place of the hearing. He was also instructed to 
periodically call a toll-free number to check and see if he had been 
assigned a court date.20 
In the months that followed, Alex dutifully checked his mail and 
called the toll-free number but never heard anything further 
regarding his hearing. While in asylum limbo, months elapsed and 
Alex began working under the table to survive while he waited for the 
government to initiate proceedings. By the time he saved enough 
 
 15. See text accompanying infra note 84. For information regarding this interview, 
contact the author. 
 16. See Christen Chapman, Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1529, 1533–34 (2010). 
 17. See 8 U.S.C. §	1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §	1235.3(b) (2015). 
 18. Those subject to expedited removal will not get to appear before a judge, will have 
no right to review, and will not informed of their right to counsel. See AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY DEPORTATIONS 
FROM THE UNITED STATES 2 (MAY 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org
/sites/default/files/research/removal_without_recourse.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR3B-7TFC]; see 
also Chapman, supra note 16, at 1566–68 (noting that United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agency attorneys are not constrained by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence when cross-examining detainees). 
 19. See text accompanying infra note 51. 
 20. For information regarding this interview, contact the author. 
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money to retain an attorney, nearly a year had passed since his arrival 
in the country. For many immigrants like Alex, making the 
sociocultural adjustments that accompany living in a foreign place is a 
challenge by itself without also having to navigate a complex legal 
system with no legal assistance. Accordingly, Alex was devastated 
when his attorney informed him that the law requires him to apply for 
asylum within one year of his arrival into the United States and that 
the credible fear interview did not formally initiate the asylum 
application process. This one-year application filing requirement, 
along with other stiff procedural and substantive requirements, 
unfairly prejudice and exclude qualified refugees like Alex from 
receiving asylum.  
II.  OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW 
A. Substantive Requirements of Asylum Law 
Under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney 
General of the United States are authorized to grant asylum to any 
applicant who qualifies as a “refugee.”21 Under 8 USC 
§	1101(a)(42)(A), a refugee is: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality	.	.	.	and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion	.	.	.	.22 
An applicant can qualify as a refugee by showing that “she has 
suffered past persecution or because she has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.”23 The burden of proof is on the applicant, and if 
the applicant is credible, her testimony can carry that burden even 
without corroboration.24 
If an applicant shows that she was actually persecuted in the past 
on the basis of a statutorily enumerated ground—race, religion 
 
 21. 8 U.S.C. §	1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 22. Id. §	1101(a)(42)(A). 
 23. 8 C.F.R. §	208.13(b) (2015). 
 24. Id. §	208.13(a). However, an asylum officer may rely on third-party sources of 
information in deciding whether an applicant qualifies as a refugee. Id. §	208.12(a).The 
sources can include government research through the Department of State or “other 
credible sources” such as “international organizations” or “academic institutions.” Id. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) 
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion—then there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.25 However, a reviewing asylum officer has considerable 
discretion to deny an application that is filed on the basis of past 
persecution.26 First, an officer may deny the application if the officer 
finds that there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” in 
the applicant’s home country that renders the fear of persecution 
moot.27 Second, an officer can also deny the application if the officer 
finds that the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to 
another part of the applicant’s country, also known as “relocation 
grounds.”28 In deciding whether relocation is reasonable, an officer 
considers a variety of factors, including “whether the applicant would 
face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation” and 
“social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health	.	.	.	and 
familial ties.”29 
These grounds for denial threaten to swallow a large subset of 
asylum cases because while the inquiries are framed as objective, it 
seems inevitable that subjective perceptions will creep into the 
analysis. For example, even officially recognized and credible sources 
of information may contain considerable variance in their assessment 
of the “circumstances” of an applicant’s home country.30 Further, an 
officer may find that relocation to another place in the refugee’s 
home country is reasonable on the basis of geographical distance or 
some other superficial factor when it is not, because of more nuanced 
“social and cultural constraints” affecting the refugee that the officer 
failed to consider.31 For instance, one of the groups that was 
persecuting the applicant before they fled could have nationwide 
 
 25. Id. §	208.13(b)(1). 
 26. Id. §	208.13(b)(1)(i). 
 27. Id. §	208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). 
 28. Id. §	208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 
 29. Id. §	208.13(b)(3). 
 30. See Christian A. Fundo, Toward a More Individualized Assessment of Changed 
Country Conditions of Kosovar Asylum-Seekers, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 611, 634–36 
(2010) (questioning accuracy of U.S. State Department materials with regard to safety 
conditions in Kosovo); Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. 
Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
197, 197, 209–12 (2000) (noting inconsistencies in U.S. State Department reports and 
criticizing their conclusory nature). 
 31. See Shu Han Liu v. Holder, 718 F.3d 706, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
petitioner’s claim of changed circumstances due to petitioner’s conversion to Christianity 
on the premise that small house churches are not persecuted); Matter of L-S, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 705, 708–09 (B.I.A. 2012) (denying asylum to petitioner based on general 
improvements to country conditions notwithstanding threats to petitioner’s personal 
safety). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) 
2017] U.S. ASYLUM LAW 529 
networks unknown to official sources. Therefore, while subjective 
judgment calls are appropriate in evaluating whether the applicant 
has a credible fear, determination of background facts, such as 
whether a country’s conditions have fundamentally changed, should 
not be left to a single immigration officer.32 Where an applicant has 
established past persecution, the asylum officer has the burden of 
proof when dismissing an application due to changed circumstances 
or on relocation grounds.33 This burden-shifting standard is an 
important strategic advantage for those applicants with meritorious 
asylum claims.  
An applicant seeking asylum on the basis of future persecution, 
rather than past persecution, must establish similar elements. The 
applicant must show a fear of persecution based on a statutorily 
enumerated ground.34 However, the applicant does not have to show 
that he would specifically be singled out for persecution in order to 
qualify for asylum. Asylum can also be granted when there is “a 
pattern or practice in [the home] country	.	.	.	of persecution of a 
group” and that the applicant is a member of that group.35 An asylum 
officer can also dismiss future persecution cases on “relocation 
grounds.”36 But unlike those applicants that have established past 
persecution, applicants whose asylum claims are based upon future 
persecution “bear the burden of establishing that it would not be 
reasonable	.	.	.	to relocate, unless the persecution is by a government 
or is government-sponsored.”37 
B. Types of Asylum Applications 
While the substantive requirements of asylum law remain the 
same regardless of how an applicant submits her application, there 
are procedural differences among the three different application 
types. The application types are affirmative, defensive, and illegal 
entrant. Generally, affirmative applications are filed by applicants 
already in the United States under some form of temporary legal 
 
 32. In other words, discretion is suitable where the officer can personally observe the 
applicant; in contrast, asking officers to make calls about a country’s conditions is 
inappropriately subjective given the inaccuracy of sources. Perhaps the harsh result of a 
denial of the application can be mitigated by making the officer’s determination a 
rebuttable presumption. 
 33. §	208.13(b)(1)(ii). 
 34. Id. §	208.13(b)(2)(i)(A); see text accompanying supra note 25. 
 35. Id. §	208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(B). 
 36. Id. §	208.13(b)(2)(ii). 
 37. Id. §	208.13(b)(3)(i). 
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status (i.e. tourist visas, student visas, or temporary work permits).38 
Conversely, defensive applications are usually a response to the 
initiation of removal proceedings.39 “Illegal entrant” applications are 
a subset of defensive applications with additional procedures due to 
the accelerated pace of deportation proceedings.40 Each of these 
application types is discussed below. 
Affirmative applications are processed by the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) through the USCIS.41 Claimants, who 
are usually already physically present in the United States, fill out 
DHS Form I-589, and mail it with supporting documentation and an 
affidavit to a DHS service center.42 If DHS declines to award the 
applicant asylum, the case is referred to immigration court.43 If the 
applicant does not have lawful status when her application is denied, 
DHS will also refer the applicant to immigration court for removal 
proceedings.44 
In a defensive application, the applicant claims asylum to prevent 
removal from the United States.45 Accordingly, a defensive asylum 
application must be filed with the immigration court with jurisdiction 
over the applicant’s case.46 Defensive applications seek two forms of 
relief: (1) asylum and (2) withholding of removal, a separate remedy 
available any time the government initiates removal proceedings.47 
The substantive requirements of withholding removal are more 
stringent than the asylum requirements. For example, an asylum 
applicant need only demonstrate a “well-founded fear” of persecution 
whereas an applicant for withholding of removal must show that 
 
 38. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/S25W-J3CN] (last updated Oct. 19, 2015). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Applicants are subject to cross-examination, and they have the veracity of their 
witnesses and other forms of proof questioned. See Chapman, supra note 16, at 155354. 
 41. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 38. 
 42. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, I-589, APPLICATION FOR 
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL, OMB NO. 1615-0067 7, 10 (Dec. 29, 
2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7Q3Y-VBRN]; Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 38. 
 43. Immigration courts are a branch of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office 
of Immigration Review. EOIR at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/DMA2-U6H9]. 
 44. See Asylum, supra note 3. 
 45. See id. 
 46. 8 C.F.R. §	208.2(b) (2015). 
 47. Id. §	208.3(b). Withholding of removal essentially stays adverse immigration 
proceedings but does not offer applicants actual asylum status. See Asylum, supra note 3 
(stating the form used to apply for asylum is called “Application for Asylum and for 
Withholding of Removal”). 
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persecution is more probable than not.48 However, an applicant 
whose asylum application is dismissed still retains the ability to ask 
for a withholding of removal.49  
Finally, illegal entrant applications are filed by persons like Alex 
who entered the country without prior authorization. These 
applicants are immediately subject to removal, and by default, 
ineligible to receive visas or be lawfully admitted in the United 
States.50 If an illegal entrant is detained and immediately expresses a 
desire to claim asylum, the detainee undergoes an initial screening 
known as the “credible fear interview.”51 The interview, although 
ostensibly non-adversarial, is still subject to procedural protections. 
For instance, regulations mandate that the interviewing officer “shall 
verify that the alien has received information about the credible fear 
information process” and understands it.52 If the applicant does not 
speak English and is unable to proceed in the interview without an 
interpreter, the officer is required to provide one.53 The applicant is 
also permitted to have a third party present at the hearing to 
corroborate her testimony, although such a consultation cannot 
“unreasonably delay” the interview.54 
An officer can find a credible fear of persecution when “there is 
a significant possibility	.	.	.	the alien can establish eligibility for 
asylum” under the ordinary, affirmative application requirements.55 If 
credible fear is found, the applicant is issued a Notice to Appear 
before an immigration judge.56 Often, this Notice to Appear actually 
does not indicate the time and place the hearing will be held.57 
Instead, as was the case for Alex, the date and time will be marked as 
“to be determined.”58 At this point an asylum application is not 
 
 48. Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of 
the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 668 (2010). 
 49. See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2003); LUTHERAN 
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV., ASYLUM SEEKERS: A SUPPLEMENT TO FIRST STEPS: 
AN LIRS GUIDE FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS, AND MIGRANTS RELEASED FROM 
DETENTION 14 (2014), www.lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/first-steps/LIRS-FirstSteps-
AsylumSeekers_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTV5-QUJ7]. 
 50. 8 U.S.C. §	1182(a)(6) (2012). 
 51. 8 C.F.R. §	208.30(d)(2). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. §	208.30(d)(5). 
 54. Id. §	208.30(d)(4). 
 55. Id. §	208.30(e)(2) (referencing section 208 of the INA codified at 8 U.S.C. §	1158). 
 56. Id. 
 57. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, 
at 69.  
 58. Another notice, called a Notice of Hearing, is required to be issued with the 
complete details of the hearing. Id. 
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considered filed for the purposes of the one-year deadline until the 
application is brought before a judge in open court.59 This is a 
problem because the clock is ticking while the applicant waits for the 
hearing to be scheduled. 
III. THE ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE 
Like other avenues to lawful status in the United States, there 
are numerous substantive and procedural bars to asylum 
applications.60 The substantive bars are concerned with whether the 
applicant is a danger to the United States or whether the applicant 
has committed acts of persecution. For instance, an applicant is not 
eligible for asylum if she “participated in the persecution of any 
person” based on one of the enumerated grounds for asylum, 
commited a serious crime, or poses a threat to national security 
among other disqualifying activities.61 In addition to the substantive 
bars, three procedural bars are set out in the INA. First, applicants 
will not be granted asylum if there is a “safe third country” that the 
applicant can be removed to “pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement.”62 Second, an applicant who has previously been denied 
asylum is barred from reapplying, unless circumstances in the 
applicant’s home country have changed in a manner that will 
“materially affect the applicant’s eligibility.”63 Finally, a person’s 
application will be denied if she does not demonstrate “by clear and 
convincing evidence that the application has been filed in one year 
after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”64 
 
 59. §	208.2(b); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 6, at 38. 
 60. There are certain grounds for inadmissibility that apply to all visas regardless of 
the statute the petition is filed under. For instance, petitioners under the Violence Against 
Women Act may be inadmissible if they previously stayed in the country illegally for more 
than six months or if they committed a crime of moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. 
§	1158(a)(2)(B)–(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 61. Id. §	1158(b)(2)(A)(i). The applicant is also ineligible if she is (1) convicted of a 
particularly serious crime; (2) if there is reason to believe that she committed a serious 
nonpolitical crime outside the United States; (3) if there is reason to believe that the 
applicant is a terrorist or otherwise a threat to the security of the United States; or (4) if 
the applicant was firmly resettled in another country before applying for asylum. Id. 
§	1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(vi). In addition to the enumerated grounds, aggravated felonies are 
considered serious crimes for the purposes of these bars. Id. §	1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 62. Id. §	1158(a)(2)(A). 
 63. Id. §	1158(a)(2)(C)–(D). 
 64. Id. §	1158(a)(2)(B). 
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A. The One-Year Bar 
The one-year bar was added in 1996 as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”).65 At the time, there was strong anti-immigrant sentiment 
among the American public, stemming in part from events such as the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing.66 There was also concern that immigrants were abusing the 
asylum process to secure employment authorization and to obtain 
welfare benefits.67 Specific criticisms regarding the defensive asylum 
process were voiced in Congress as well, with one representative 
stating: “if you believe enough in America to claim asylum, you ought 
to come forward and not wait till someone says, Gotcha.”68 At the 
same time, other members of Congress believed that the one-year 
requirement would not deter much fraud, but would primarily 
frustrate legitimate claims.69 The sponsor of the IIRIRA tried to 
alleviate these concerns by assuring critics that immigration 
authorities would provide notice of the new one-year deadline to new 
immigrants.70 However, notice about the deadline has yet to be made 
available to applicants as a matter of policy.71 
The one-year bar requires an applicant to prove that the 
application is being filed within one year of the applicant’s arrival in 
the United States.72 However, this requirement can be waived by an 
asylum officer73 if the applicant shows “changed circumstances 
 
 65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, §	604(2)(B), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-691 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §	1158 (2012)). 
 66. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND 
IMMIGRANTS HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 16 (2007), http://hrw
.org/reports/2007/us0707/us0707web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLN4-HGUN]; Sentenced Home, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/sentencedhome/immigration.html [https://perma
.cc/XJD7-BZPC]. 
 67. Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to 
Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693, 695 (2008). Public opinion may also 
have been influenced by a 1993 television segment which purported to show thousands of 
immigrants arriving without paperwork and filing false asylum claims. Celia W. Dugger, 
Immigration Bills’ Deadlines May Imperil Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/12/nyregion/immigration-bills-deadlines-may-imperil
-asylum-seekers.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/6HRX-GF5Q]. 
 68. Dugger, supra note 67. 
 69. Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 695–96. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 696 n.12. 
 72. 8 U.S.C §	1158(a)(2)(B) (2012).  
 73. Id. §	1158(a)(2)(D). 
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materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for asylum,”74 or if the 
applicant provides evidence of extraordinary circumstances 
contributing to the delay in filing.75 The one-year bar has been 
criticized for unfairly penalizing otherwise deserving applicants. 
Scholars Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice observed a number of 
cases where applicants were granted “withholding of removal” but 
were denied asylum solely because of the one-year bar.76 As 
mentioned, the substantive standard for granting a “withholding of 
removal” is “even more rigorous than	.	.	.	required for asylum.”77 The 
fact that an applicant can qualify for withholding of removal,78 but 
still be denied asylum because of this procedural bar,79 shows that the 
bar is frustrating valid claims.  
Studies have also suggested that the asylum officer’s power to 
waive the one-year bar through the “changed circumstances” and 
“extraordinary circumstances” exceptions is inequitably wielded.80 
Theoretically these exceptions provide some flexibility to an 
otherwise rigid requirement. But research shows there is a troubling 
level of variance among case outcomes. For instance, inspected Latin 
American applicants were rejected 66% more often on the basis of 
the one-year bar than inspected North African and Middle Eastern 
applicants.81 Researchers also found variation among immigration 
offices, with some offices awarding exceptions in 45% of cases 
 
 74. 8 C.F.R. §	208.4(a)(4)(5) (2015). For instance, if the applicant’s circumstances or 
the conditions of the applicant’s country have deteriorated significantly, the delay could be 
excused. See Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 697. 
 75. 8 U.S.C. §	1158(a)(2)(D) (2012). Examples of extraordinary circumstances include 
serious mental or physical illness and legal disability. See Musalo and Rice, supra note 67, 
at 697. 
 76. See Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 693. Karen Musalo is a professor of law and 
director of the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies at University of California Hastings 
College of Law and has written extensively about the asylum process. UC Hastings 
Faculty: Karen Musalo, UC HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW SAN FRANSCISCO, http://www
.uchastings.edu/faculty/musalo/index.php [https://perma.cc/X625-5RVE]. Marcelle Rice is 
a practicing immigration attorney in Oakland, California. Meet our Attorneys: Marcelle 
Rice, LAW OFF. OF ROBERT L. LEWIS, http://www.immigrantdefense.com/attorneys
/marcelle-rice [https://perma.cc/JL8D-QF3J].  
 77. See Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 700. These determinations are initially made 
by asylum officers, who are under the authority of DHS, and subsequently reviewed by 
immigration judges, who are under the authority of the EOIR. Id.  
 78. “Withholding removal” is effectively a deportation stay and is a more limited form 
of relief compared to a full grant of asylum. Id. “Withholding removal” is person-specific 
and family members cannot obtain derivative status. It does not allow the person to apply 
for a green card and does not authorize a person to work. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 700–03; Schrag et al., supra note 48, at 726–54. 
 81. Schrag et al., supra note 48, at 727. 
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compared to rates as high as 70% in other locations.82 Finally, 
exception granting rates can also vary significantly between officers in 
the same office. In one office, an officer rejected cases for missing the 
one-year deadline at a rate of 49% whereas another rejected cases at 
nearly 78%.83 
Applicant ethnicity and immigration office location are not the 
only factors correlated with disparate outcomes. Generally, those 
applicants who enter without inspection (“EWI”)—that is, cross the 
border illegally—miss the one-year filing deadline at a greater rate.84 
Between 1999 and 2000 the number of EWI cases with a finding of 
“late filing” doubled.85 The author of the study suggested two reasons 
for this increase: (1) asylum offices post-2001 may have required a 
higher standard of proof for the date of entry or (2) officers, doubting 
the credibility of those entering illegally, may have more thoroughly 
scrutinized the applicants’ claimed date of entry.86 
There is little research specifically about whether the one-year 
requirement has affected affirmative and defensive applications 
differently. However, qualitative evidence suggests that the one-year 
bar disproportionately impacts illegal entrant asylum applicants for 
two reasons.87 First, these kinds of applicants are not lawfully 
permitted to work and may lack the financial resources to retain legal 
counsel to help prove that their application is timely.88 Second, lack of 
familiarity with American culture and social structures—including the 
courts—may also prevent illegal entrant applicants from following up 
on their initial expression of desire to apply for asylum.89 From the 
point of view of an illegal entrant who knows nothing about 
 
 82. Id. at 738. 
 83. Id. at 740. 
 84. Id. at 699. 
 85. Id. at 708. 
 86. Id. at 709. 
 87. Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 718. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. Disparities in successful asylum applications between represented and 
unrepresented applicants may provide some support for this theory. An ABA-sponsored 
study found that only 14% of non-represented asylum-seekers were successful as 
compared to 39% of those with counsel. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE QUEST TO FULFILL 
OUR NATION’S PROMISE OF LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: ABA POLICIES ON ISSUES 
AFFECTING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES 7 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/directories/policy/2006_my_107a.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4YD-
RV9X]. Another study found that immigrants were often pursuing temporary relief 
because they were unaware they qualified for permanent status. See Tom K. Wong et al., 
Paths to Lawful Immigration Status: Results and Implications from the PERSON Survey, 2 
J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 287, 301 (2014), http://jmhs.cmsny.org/index.php
/jmhs/article/download/37/30 [https://perma.cc/3GEC-82U2]. 
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immigration law, the apparent formalities surrounding the credible 
fear interview might inadvertently lure the entrant into believing that 
this interview was the formal filing of the asylum application. 
B. Judicial Review of Untimely Filing 
If a deserving, yet untimely applicant is not fortunate enough to 
have the one-year bar waived by an immigration judge, the applicant 
could be deported. Further compounding that person’s plight is the 
limited ability of federal courts to review an immigration court’s 
determination of untimely filing. The same legislation that enacted 
the one-year bar also removed judicial review of certain 
determinations made by asylum officers and immigration judges.90 
Whether an asylum application was filed within one year of the 
applicant’s date of entry into the United States is one such 
determination.91 The Real ID Act92 restored some level of judicial 
review for immigration determinations, but limited such review to 
questions of law.93  
However, there is a circuit split as to what is considered a 
question of law. In Ramadan v. Gonzales,94 the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the Real ID Act as it applied to judicial review of 
untimely asylum application filings.95 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
Real ID Act extended judicial review to an immigration judge’s 
determination of untimely filing because it was a “mixed question of 
law and fact.”96 The court reviewed the legislative history of the Real 
 
 90. See 8 U.S.C. §	1252(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012); Donald S. Dobkin, Court Stripping and 
Limitations on Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 104, 104 (2007), 
http://hoth.bizango.s3.amazonaws.com/assets/10116/COURT_STRIPPING.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Z6BK-TELY]. The asylum statute states that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to 
review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” §	1158(a)(3). 
 91. Id. §	1158(a)(2)(B). 
 92. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. §	1252(a)(2)(D) (2012)). 
 93. Id. (“Nothing	.	.	.	in any	.	.	.	provision of this Act	.	.	.	which limits or eliminates 
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or 
questions of law	.	.	.	.”). 
 94. 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 95. Id. at 650. The petitioner, Ramadan, was an outspoken proponent of women’s 
rights in Egypt who was threatened and her son was kidnapped on account of her beliefs. 
Id. at 649. She came to the United States in September of 1999 and received further 
threats to her safety in February 2001. Id. She then applied for asylum in June 2001, 
arguing that she deserved a waiver of the filing deadline because the threats in February 
2001 constituted changed circumstances relating to the merits of her claim. Id. The 
immigration judge denied her application because of the untimely filing and rejected her 
changed circumstances claim. Id. 
 96. Id. at 653–54. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) 
2017] U.S. ASYLUM LAW 537 
ID Act and considered the impact of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. St. Cyr,97 a case holding that federal courts have the 
authority to review questions of law presented in a habeas corpus 
petition notwithstanding the provisions seeking to limit that authority 
in both IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (“AEDPA”).98 The Ninth Circuit noted that St. Cyr was partially 
decided on Suspension Clause grounds99 and, in turn, based its 
reading of the Real ID Act on a desire to avoid a “constitutionally 
suspect” interpretation.100 The Ramadan court opined that review of 
mixed questions of law and fact are confined to “situations in which 
the historical facts and applicable legal standard are undisputed but 
the agency’s application of those facts to law are at issue.”101  
The Ninth Circuit’s position on judicial review of mixed 
questions of law and fact, specifically applied to review of the 
timeliness of asylum claims, is unique among the circuits. Although 
the Second Circuit, in Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Department of Justice,102 
engaged in a similar analysis of St. Cyr and AEDPA to expand its 
interpretation of what constitutes a question of law, it ultimately 
decided that an immigration judge’s determination of timeliness and 
exceptional circumstances was not fit for review.103 Most of the 
circuits agree with that conclusion.104  
Unfortunately, the slim possibility of judicial review is not the 
only barrier faced by illegal entrants who have their asylum 
applications denied on the basis of the one-year bar. If the 
government delays or fails to schedule the hearing, or if the hearing is 
scheduled but notice fails to reach the petitioner, the illegal entrant’s 
application may be unfairly barred by the one-year requirement. 
 
 97. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 98. Id. at 314; Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 64849. 
 99. Id. at 651. The Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that the writ 
of habeas corpus cannot ordinarily be suspended. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	9. 
 100. Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 654. 
 101. Id. at 653. Interestingly, once the court decided it had jurisdiction to entertain the 
petitioner’s claim, it affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. Id. at 657 
 102. 471 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 103. Id. at 326–27, 332. 
 104. See Gomis v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Nearly every circuit 
that has analyzed §	1158(a)(3) in light of §	1252(a)(2)(D) has held that even after the 
REAL ID Act, the federal courts continue to lack jurisdiction over the determination 
whether the alien demonstrated changed or extraordinary circumstances that would 
excuse an untimely filing.”). 
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IV.  IMMIGRATION SYSTEM FAILURES THAT PREVENT APPLICANTS 
FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ONE-YEAR DEADLINE 
In order to comply with the one-year deadline, a defensive 
applicant must file an asylum application with the proper immigration 
court, usually by presenting the appropriate forms at the applicant’s 
first scheduled appearance.105 However, there are two situations 
where a defensive applicant is unable to do this. First, if USCIS 
officers fail to docket a case with the immigration court, the 
applicant’s hearing can never be scheduled. In that case, there is no 
hearing where the applicant can present and file the application.106 
Second, even if the government does docket the case and the hearing 
is scheduled, the applicant may be unaware of the date and location 
of the hearing due to the erosion of service standards.107 In both cases, 
the result may be that a deserving asylum applicant is deported for 
missing a deadline that was practically impossible for the applicant to 
meet. 
A. Immigration Officers Often Fail to Schedule an Applicant’s 
Hearing 
The plain language of the INA statute states that proper notice 
should include a description of “[t]he time and place at which 
proceedings will be held.”108 Notwithstanding that provision, it is 
common practice for there to be no date for the master calendar 
hearing printed on the Notice to Appear that is issued after a credible 
fear interview.109 In fact, in what seems to be in direct contrast to the 
INA statutes and regulations, the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review (“EOIR”) practice manual instructs “DHS may serve a 
 
 105. See 8 C.F.R. §	1208.4 (2015); see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 38.  
 106. See §	1003.13 (stating that a Notice to Appear includes information such as the 
nature of the proceedings and the charges against the applicant, but not the date and time 
of the hearing); see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 5960. 
 107. In 2011, service upon an applicant could be accomplished either in person or by 
first class mail. §	1003.32 (2011). However, the current standard for service states that if 
personal service was not practicable, a Notice to Appear could be served upon the 
applicant by regular mail. §	1003.13 (2015).  
 108. 8 U.S.C. §	1129(a)(1)(G)(i) (2012). 
 109. SANDRA A. GROSSMAN & LINDSAY M. HARRIS, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 
PRESERVING THE ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE FOR ASYLUM CASES STUCK IN THE 
IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG 6 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites
/default/files/practice_advisory/preserving_the_one-year_filing_deadline_for_asylum_cases
_stuck_in_the_immigration_court_backlog_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK3R-
STLZ]. 
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Notice to Appear	.	.	.	on an alien, but not file the Notice to Appear 
with the court until sometime later.”110 Cases examining the notice 
protections afforded to asylum seekers cite 8 C.F.R. §	1003.18(b) for 
the authority to withhold the time and place of a hearing until a 
subsequent Notice of Hearing is issued.111 However, this regulation 
actually provides that “[i]n the case of any change or postponement in 
the time and place of such proceeding, the Immigration Court shall 
provide written notice to the alien specifying the new time and place 
of the proceeding.”112 The plain language of the regulation seems to 
limit its application to instances where DHS is re-scheduling a 
hearing—and not to situations where DHS has not set the time and 
place of the hearing in the first place. This practice of not 
simultaneously scheduling an asylum applicant’s hearing following the 
credible fear interview is not only a possibility, but a prevalent 
reality.113 If the Notice to Appear does not indicate the time and place 
of the applicant’s hearing, the government instructs the applicant to 
call a hotline to determine whether his case has been scheduled.114 
In some instances, due to either clerical errors or the enormous 
backlog in the immigration courts, some cases simply never get 
docketed at the appropriate immigration court by immigration 
officials.115 Even if the case is docketed, the date of the hearing may 
fall beyond the applicant’s filing deadline, making it technically 
impossible for the applicant to meet the one-year deadline. To get 
around this particular situation, the applicant is expected to file a 
motion to advance the court date inside the one-year deadline.116 In 
the situation where officials never docket the case after the credible 
fear interview, the applicant could file an affirmative application to 
avoid the one-year deadline. However, these are not obvious 
solutions for most asylum applicants. Furthermore, filing a motion or 
 
 110. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, 
at 60.  
 111. Mater of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 669 (B.I.A. 2008) (stating that 8 C.F.R. 
§	1003.18(b) places the responsibility on the Immigration Court to schedule cases and 
provide the required notice of hearing). 
 112. 8 C.F.R. §	1003.18(b) (emphases added).  
 113. See GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 109, at 1; EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 6, at 56. 
 114. Customer Service Initiatives: Immigration Case Status Information, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/customer-service-initiatives [http://perma.cc/N2YZ-
3T34] (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (providing a hotline number that applicants can call to 
find the date, time, and location of their next hearing using their alien registration 
numbers).  
 115. See GROSSMAN & HARRIS, supra note 109, at 1. 
 116. Id. at 7–8.  
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affirmative application will most likely require that the applicant 
retain and pay for legal assistance, even despite lacking legal 
authorization to work.117 Asylum applications also require multiple 
fees and documentation that may be expensive to obtain.118 In short, 
the submission of an asylum application is a complex and time 
consuming process that is a significant challenge for persons with 
limited English proficiency and little to no legal knowledge.119  
B. Current Service Standards for Asylum Cases Fail to Provide 
Actual Notice 
If the government dockets a case and schedules a hearing, a 
Notice of Hearing will be sent via regular mail to the applicant’s last 
known address.120 However, because illegal entrants are likely to 
change residences upon arriving in the United States,121 an applicant 
may never receive this notice. Therefore, service via regular mail is 
not a reasonably calculated means of actually informing many 
applicant of the time and place of the asylum hearing. 
Amendments to the asylum statutes have made it harder for 
some applicants to receive notice and have exacerbated the problem. 
The IIRIRA of 1996 made it acceptable to perfect service on 
defendants in immigration cases via regular mail.122 Prior to this 
amendment, the asylum statute required personal service or service 
by certified mail,123 and there was even authority stating that service 
 
 117. Free legal services are hard to find and most applicants have to hire a small law 
firm or solo practitioner. By one study, only about two percent of all immigrants facing 
removal obtained pro bono legal services. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National 
Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2015). 
 118. Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 719. 
 119. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 120. 8 U.S.C. §	1229(a)(1)(F)(i) (2012). This statute provides that defensive asylum 
applicants have a duty to provide a correct address as well as notify USCIS of any change 
in address. See id. It is important for all applicants for immigration status to fulfill this 
responsibility so that they can be served with further documentation. 
 121. See June Marie Nogle, Immigrants on the Move: How Internal Migration Increases 
the Concentration of the Foreign-born, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 1996), http://cis.org
/InternalMigration-ImmigrantConcentration [https://perma.cc/HRX7-AV9M]. For example, 
Alex’s official address changed several times within a year of arriving: it was first at his 
initial detention center in Texas, then at a friend’s residence while he looked for work, and 
then another residence he rented on his own. Other immigrants may relocate from where 
they entered in order to live in immigrant-rich communities. 
 122. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). This was also the Act that established the one-year bar to 
asylum. 
 123. Compare 8 U.S.C. §	1252(b)(a)(1) (1994) (requiring written notice, also known as 
an “order to show cause[,]” to be served by certified mail), with 8 U.S.C. §	1229(a)(1) 
(2012) (allowing a “notice to appear” to be served through regular mail). 
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would be ineffective unless the certified mail receipt was signed by 
the addressee.124 The removal of these basic procedural safeguards 
has negatively impacted defensive asylum applicants. 
Under 8 C.F.R. §	1003.26, “[w]ritten notice to the alien shall be 
considered sufficient for purposes of this section if it was provided at 
the most recent address provided by the alien.” A decision by a panel 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted that regulation as 
meaning that a “letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed is 
presumed to have been duly delivered to the addressee.”125 The 
strength of this delivery presumption has been questioned by another 
panel of the Board of Immigration Appeals.  
In Matter of M-R-A-,126 the respondent was an affirmative asylum 
applicant who filed his application directly with DHS.127 After a 
preliminary hearing, the government issued him a Notice to Appear, 
instructing him to appear on a certain date.128 Later, DHS issued the 
respondent a second Notice of Hearing advancing his hearing date 
forward one week.129 He failed to respond to that notice and was 
ordered removed in absentia.130 On a motion to reopen proceedings 
before an immigration judge, the respondent claimed he had never 
received the Notice of Hearing with the new hearing date.131 He also 
submitted affidavits corroborating his story,132 but the immigration 
judge denied the motion on the grounds that “the presumption that 
postal officers properly discharge their duties had not been 
rebutted.”133 On appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
the respondent argued that the immigration judge improperly applied 
a stronger presumption of delivery because the cases on which the 
judge relied dealt with instances of delivery by certified mail.134 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals held that the judge improperly denied 
the motion to reopen and recognized that regular mail is afforded a 
 
 124. Matter of Huete, 20 I. & N. Dec. 250, 253 (B.I.A. 1991) (holding that in order to 
effect personal service of an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing sent by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, the receipt must be signed by the addressee or a 
responsible person at his or her address and returned). 
 125. Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 671 (B.I.A. 2008) (quoting Matter of M-D, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 546 (B.I.A. 2002)). 
 126. Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 127. Id. at 666. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 666–67. 
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“weaker presumption” of delivery than certified mail.135 The focus of 
the inquiry, then, was whether the respondent actually received the 
notice and not merely whether it was delivered.136 
The emphasis on actual delivery in Matter of M-R-A- suggests 
that when an affirmative asylum applicant faces a penalty for 
procedural error, the applicant should be given an opportunity to 
contest or remedy the error before immigration consequences 
manifest. Thus, in the “defensive” asylum application context, an 
applicant facing dismissal due to the one-year deadline after never 
receiving a Notice of Hearing should be afforded the same 
opportunity to contest the presumption of delivery. However, as 
noted above, compliance with the one-year filing determination is 
ordinarily a question of fact that is not reviewable, in contrast to the 
narrower, but related question presented in Matter of M-R-A- 
regarding the presumption of delivery. Given this tension, the 
procedural rights of immigrants cannot be reliably safeguarded via 
appellate review. Rather, for illegal entrant asylum applicants, 
procedural rights should be protected by allowing them to count their 
initial credible fear interview as applying for the purposes of the one-
year deadline. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The harsh and unjust effects that the one-year bar imposes on 
some asylum applicants can be done away with, or at least mitigated, 
by enacting any of the following the following proposals. The asylum 
statutes could be amended to (1) eliminate the one-year bar all 
together, (2) expressly permit judicial review of denied asylum 
application in a certain class of cases, (3) require certified mail as the 
means of service for hearing notices, or (4) allow a successful credible 
fear interview to “lodge” an applicant’s application for purposes of 
the one-year bar.  
 
 135. See id. at 671–73. The Board of Immigration Appeals noted that, in the Second 
Circuit, “the burden of proof to overcome the ‘slight’ presumption of receipt in the 
context of regular mail is significantly lower than the burden set forth for certified mail.” 
Id. at 672. The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have all recognized a reduction in 
the strength of the presumption. Santana Gonzalez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 506 F.3d 274, 279 
(3d Cir. 2007); Kozak v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2007); Nibagwire v. Gonzales, 
450 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 2006); Maknojiya v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 136. Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. &. N. at 673–74 (“[W]hen an immigration judge 
adjudicates a respondent’s motion to reopen	.	.	.	based on a claim that a Notice to Appear 
or Notice of Hearing sent by regular mail to the most recent address provided was not 
received, all relevant evidence submitted to overcome the weaker presumption of delivery 
must be considered.”). 
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A. Congress Should Abolish the One-Year Deadline 
The most immediate way to solve the problem of asylum 
applicants being unable to fulfill the one-year deadline due to 
procedural error is to abolish the one-year deadline entirely. Both the 
procedural and substantive bars found in section 18 U.S.C. 
§	1158(b)(2)(A),137 in contrast to the one-year filing deadline, are 
reasonably drawn restrictions on asylum applicants. These substantive 
bars are clearly pertinent to the overarching goal of efficiently 
allocating asylum benefits to qualified and deserving applicants. 
Applicants with unclean hands—who themselves have subjected 
others to persecution—are rightfully denied the opportunity for 
asylum. A past history of serious criminal activity is also a factor fairly 
considered. There is undoubtedly variance in different jurisdictions as 
to prosecutorial discretion and sentencing, which in turn influences 
what would be considered a serious crime under the statute.138 These 
variations could then lead to inequities such as similarly situated 
applicants receiving disparate immigration consequences for the same 
actions. However, the immigration system operates with severely 
constrained resources and processes far more applicants than it was 
designed to handle.139 As such, barring applications from those with 
serious criminal histories is at least a fair policy choice. 
Most of the “procedural” bars are also reasonable restrictions. 
For example, the safe third country provision140 is not truly a bar to 
asylum—it recognizes that an applicant is potentially deserving of 
asylum and ensures that there is actually another place where the 
applicant can be relocated.141 Similarly, the bar on reapplication 
 
 137. See supra Part III. 
 138. Immigration judges can review available evidence regarding the conviction. This 
review may invite a “retrial” of the underlying offense. See Nadeen Aljijakli, Statutory 
Bars to Asylum: What Is So Serious About a ‘Particularly Serious Crime?’, in AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS 491 (AILA ed., 
2012–2013 ed.). 
 139. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN THE BALANCE: BACKLOGS DELAY PROTECTION 
IN THE U.S. ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEMS 7 (2016), http://www
.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-In-The-Balance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K9K-
BSBN] (discussing the rapid growth of backlogged cases at the asylum division resulting 
from an increase in the number of credible fear and reasonable fear interviews, without a 
corresponding increase in funding). 
 140. 8 U.S.C. §	1158(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 141. For instance, the United States and Canada sought review from the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding their respective safety before 
implementing a “safe third country” agreement between themselves. See UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, MONITORING REPORT, CANADA-UNITED 
STATES “SAFE THIRD COUNTRY” AGREEMENT 10 (2006), https://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/files/article/appendix-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FYM-TW5P]. 
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supposes that the application has at least been previously considered 
on the merits.142 
Unlike all of the above provisions, however, the one-year bar is 
strictly procedural and has nothing to do with the merits of the 
underlying application.143 The requirement does not function to 
screen out dangerous individuals or those that have subjected others 
to persecution. Instead, it was passed with a goal of preventing 
fraudulent applications for employment authorization.144 However, 
because of the Employment Authorization Deadline statutes, there is 
now a specific mechanism to prevent the type of fraud once feared—
applicants must wait at least 180 days until after their asylum 
applications are officially filed to apply for work authorization.145 
Arguably, the one-year bar is duplicative and no longer necessary in 
light of its original justification. 
Professors Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice also argue that the 
bar should be abolished because, on balance, it does more harm than 
good.146 As opposed to preventing fraud, the bar actively frustrates 
otherwise valid claims, evidenced by the high rate of instances where 
an immigration judge denies asylum yet grants withholding of 
removal.147 In a similar manner, the bar punishes applicants who may 
try alternative forms of relief before applying for asylum.148 
Furthermore, the bar is an affront to the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, an agreement ratified by the United States 
that helped establish the asylum system.149 Under this protocol 
participating nations are prohibited from “expel[ing] or [returning] a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, 
 
 142. See supra Section III.A. 
 143. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_united
_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8J2-AEED]; Susan S. Clark, Note, The Illegal Immigration 
Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act’s One-Year Filing Deadline on Applications for 
Asylum: The Narrow Interpretation and Application of Exceptions to the Filing Deadline, 
22 GA. ST. L. REV. 463, 470–71 (2005). 
 144. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 145. §	1158(d)(2). 
 146. Musalo & Rice, supra note 67, at 722. 
 147. See id. at 699–700. The judge is in effect admitting that the applicant has a 
meritorious case while denying the appropriate relief on account of the bar. Id. 
 148. See id. at 722. Musalo and Rice describe an applicant who applied for a religious 
worker visa, was denied, and then could not apply for asylum because he was beyond the 
deadline. Id. 
 149. Id. at 711. 
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[or] nationality	.	.	.	.”150 The protocol provided the motivation behind 
the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.151 The United Nations 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining the Status of 
Refugees, which interprets the requirements of the protocol, provides 
that technical problems should not bar consideration of a legitimate 
asylum claim.152 Against this background of collective international 
intent, it seems apparent that maintaining the one-year bar is contrary 
to the foundational purposes of the asylum system. 
Nonetheless, there are practical reasons for resisting the urge to 
drop the bar altogether. First, there is a pressing risk of overcrowding 
the immigration court system.153 A sudden influx of applications could 
backfire because asylum officers would inevitably have to dedicate 
less time and attention to each particular case they encounter. In the 
end, this could mean that deserving applicants may not get the 
consideration they deserve, or that deserving applicants could have to 
wait significantly longer. Second, it would be difficult to summon the 
political will to pass such an amendment to the INA given the current 
political climate and public aversion to admitting refugees.154 That 
said, there are other ways to solve the problem that are more 
politically feasible. Legislation could be passed that would allow 
federal courts to review timeliness or that would once again require 
certified mail for certain notices, like asylum applicants’ Notices of 
Hearing. 
B. Congress Should Resolve the Circuit Split and Permit Federal 
Courts to Review Determinations of Timeliness 
Federal courts should be allowed to review immigration courts’ 
adjudications of timeliness, notwithstanding some compelling 
 
 150. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 30 (2010), http://www.unhcr.org
/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FQ9-QYH8] (containing the 
text of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). 
 151. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987) (noting that the Protocol 
provided the motivation behind the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980). 
 152. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND 
GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 8 (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4W8-J8VZ] 
 153. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 154. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, U.S. Public Seldom Has Welcomed Refugees into 
Country, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2005), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19
/u-s-public-seldom-has-welcomed-refugees-into-country/ [https://perma.cc/7Q2L-6QRF]; 
Elizabeth McElvein, What Do Americans Really Think About Syrian Refugees?, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/03/04/what-
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interests for limiting judicial review in this arena. For example, lower 
courts have more direct exposure to evidence, witnesses, parties, and 
counsel, and permitting review of all findings of fact would confound 
the lower courts’ authority while clogging appellate court dockets. 
There may also be some separation of powers concerns, and the 
courts may be reluctant to interfere with immigration matters that are 
ordinarily in the province of the executive branch.155  
Nonetheless, the determination of whether an asylum application 
was timely filed is a mixed question of law and fact that arguably 
leans more toward a question of law. Strictly speaking, determining 
whether or not a date stamped on a paper application occurred more 
than a year ago is a straightforward question of fact. But this is not 
the only question an immigration judge must resolve. The judge must 
also decide whether the applicant qualifies for any of the statutory 
exceptions. Judicial review of this type of mixed legal and factual 
finding is a properly within the purview of an appellate court. More 
specifically, federal appellate courts should be permitted to review 
asylum cases to determine whether or not an administrative judge 
ignored substantial evidence that would have clearly justified granting 
an exception, or otherwise erred in the decision.  
To mitigate the potential impacts on federal dockets, Congress 
should limit review to very specific instances, like determining 
whether or not any of the statutory exceptions applied. The power 
could be reserved for mixed questions of law and fact that have a 
disproportionate impact on an applicant’s success on the merits. The 
magnitude of appeals could be further tempered by making review 
discretionary. 
C. Congress Could Require Simultaneous Scheduling of Hearings 
and Use of Certified Mail for Notices of Hearing 
Other legislation could address the fundamental problem of 
failing to make sure an applicant receives critical information about 
an asylum case. As noted above, there is no express legislative 
authority permitting USCIS to first issue in person “blank” Notices to 
Appear with no hearing date and then later mail the Notice of 
Hearing that identifies the date and time of the defensive asylum 
 
 155. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (holding that because Congress 
granted authority to the attorney general over immigration decisions, other branches of 
government, including Congress itself, must abide by that authority until such delegation is 
legislatively altered or revoked); Dobkin, supra note 90, at 104 (“The Supreme Court has 
suggested that ‘protecting the Executive’s discretion	.	.	.	can fairly be said to be the theme 
of the legislation.’	”). 
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applicant’s first appearance before an immigration judge.156 Instead, 
this practice seems to stem from the rise in immigration cases handled 
by the system and is used to make it easier for courts to schedule 
cases.157 Despite the administrative usefulness of this docket control 
technique, it has a real humanitarian cost—it can take away a 
deserving asylum applicant’s day in court. Accordingly, Congress 
could end the practice by requiring immigration officers to issue 
Notices to Appear that contain the time and place of applicants’ first 
hearing before they leave the immigration office.158 This requirement 
would better ensure that applicants actually know when and where to 
appear, since mailing these notices to applicants who frequently 
change addresses is often futile. 
Alternatively, if it is logistically impracticable to require courts to 
schedule hearings contemporaneously, Congress could amend the 
INA to restore the pre-IIRIRA certified mail service provisions.159 
Specifically, certified mail would be required and a signed receipt 
would be necessary in order for a court to presume delivery. Under 
the current regular mail service standard, if a Notice of Hearing fails 
to be delivered to the applicant and the applicant fails to appear on 
the scheduled date, the person can be summarily deported with no 
opportunity to present any reasons that would justify the failure to 
appear. Under the certified mail standard, the applicant would not be 
automatically barred from making a case. Instead, the person would 
have the burden of proving that the failure to appear was reasonable 
in light of the circumstances. Additionally, if the notice is successfully 
delivered via certified mail, the applicant would be barred from 
arguing that the applicant lacked sufficient notice because there 
would be a verified receipt. 
D. Credible Fear Interview Should Lodge Illegal Entrant Asylum 
Applications 
The most effective way to prevent qualified illegal entrant 
applicants from slipping through the cracks is to presume that an 
applicant has lodged the application after the applicant has 
successfully completed the credible fear interview. The process of 
lodging asylum applications has already been employed in the context 
 
 156. See supra Section IV.A. 
 157. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 139, at 7–9. 
 158. This also removes the risk that a Notice of Hearing will be addressed incorrectly. 
 159. See 8 U.S.C. §	1252(b)(a)(1) (1994); see also supra notes 123–25 and 
accompanying text. 
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of the Employment Authorization Deadline (“EAD”).160 In that 
context, prior to an appearance before an immigration judge, an 
applicant is permitted to bring a paper copy of the application to the 
clerk of court and his application will be considered “lodged,” starting 
the countdown until the applicant is eligible for employment.161 In the 
illegal entrant asylum context, a successful credible fear interview 
should automatically lodge the application for the limited purpose of 
satisfying the one-year filing deadline. 
Lodging was first utilized in the EAD context in response to a 
lawsuit which challenged an official EOIR policy. The EAD statute 
provided that asylum applicants are eligible for employment 
authorization documents 180 days after their applications are filed 
with the immigration court.162 In theory, once a complete application 
is filed, the 180-day EAD period starts. However, prior to December 
2013, the EOIR had a policy of not starting the 180-day period until 
the applicant first made a “substantive” appearance before an 
immigration judge.163 A class action suit was filed on behalf of 
immigrants, and as part of the settlement, the EOIR agreed to allow 
applicants to lodge their applications before their first substantive 
appearances by submitting their paper applications to the clerk of 
court.164 At that point, the date is noted by EOIR, sent to USCIS, and 
the EAD clock starts running.165 
If lodging were to be applied to the one-year filing deadline, it 
would mean that as soon as an illegal entrant asylum applicant is 
found to have a credible fear of persecution, that applicant’s 
application would be considered filed with USCIS. This main 
 
 160. See Settlement Agreement at 15, B.H. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., No. CV11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. May 6, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Legal%20Settlement%20Notices%20and%20Agreements
/ABT%20v%20USCIS%20DRAFT%20SETTLEMENT%20AGREEMENT%20-%20
FILED%20-%20050613.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9UR-53EK].  
 161. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
180-DAY ASYLUM EAD CLOCK NOTICE (2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files
/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/Asylum_Clock_Joint_Notice
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K36D-C95D]. 
 162. See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, B.H. v. 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. CV11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2012), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-WA-0019-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/U874-
X8EY]. 
 163. In the meantime, however, these applicants were unable to secure a legal means 
of employment because they could not get their employment authorization documents. 
See id. at 4. It is unclear where the EOIR found the authority to distinguish between 
“filing” in an open court and appearing before an immigration judge. 
 164. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 160, at 15.  
 165. See id. at 16. 
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difference between asylum application lodging and lodging in the 
EAD context is that no paper asylum application would have to be 
filed. The credible fear interview would act as a substitute for a 
physical application.  
The argument that there is a strong incentive for deserving 
asylum applicants to dodge their immigration court date after their 
applications are lodged—an argument earnestly made when Congress 
instituted the one-year requirement—is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the risks associated with living in the country 
without legal status.166 While failing to appear in court may reduce the 
immediate likelihood of an adverse outcome for an individual, living 
without legal status increases the possibility of adverse immigration 
outcomes in the long run. Basic tasks conducted in public, like driving 
or grocery shopping, increase the chance of being identified. In turn, 
this creates a significantly higher risk of deportation. And if an 
applicant does decide to work, it will necessarily be under the table, 
and the lack of legal status will create a power imbalance between the 
applicant and the employer. Since the risk of deportation constantly 
looms, an unscrupulous boss can use this threat as a tool for 
manipulation and subjugation.167 Perhaps the most unfortunate 
consequence of not having status pertains to the reunification of the 
immigrant’s family. An alien without status has no way of lawfully 
bringing relatives into the country.168 The potential consequences of 
living without status are serious.  
These risks highlight the strong disincentives deserving 
applicants encounter when considering whether to abandon their 
 
 166. Such immigrants, especially children, live in fear of being taken away from their 
families and are often bullied or ostracized. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
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/topics/immigration/report.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TR4-6PQ7]; Julia Preston, Risks Seen 
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applications. If a person passes the credible fear interview, the asylum 
case presumably has some merit. Such a person, who has already 
suffered extensively to even reach to the U.S. border, is not likely to 
submit to the harsh consequences of living without status when the 
person has a chance at obtaining asylum. The law should not penalize 
these kinds of applicants. To allow them to be deported without a 
hearing on the merits, the consequence of the one-year filing 
deadline, runs counter to the humanitarian goals of asylum. Lodging 
is a solution that promotes those goals because it prevents people like 
Alex from having to choose between living in the shadows or being 
deported to a dangerous place due to a mere procedural error.  
On the other hand, there is a valid concern that allowing credible 
fear interviews to lodge applications could cause a significant increase 
in applications, adding stress to an already stressed system. In fact, 
the problems described in this Recent Development are due in part to 
official responses to overburdened immigration courts. Implementing 
this proposal could cause the raw number of applications to increase, 
but it is unlikely that the immigration system will face monumental 
case load increases. This proposal assumes that asylum officers will 
continue to conduct credible fear interviews thoroughly and to make 
reasonable determinations of the applicants’ credibility. Therefore, 
those applications motivated purely by a desire to lodge and abandon 
the asylum process are likely to be screened out by the relatively 
rigorous requirements of the credible fear interview.169 That is, if an 
immigration officer finds that there is a significant possibility that an 
applicant can establish eligibility for asylum, then that finding should 
remedy the concerns of fraud that originally motivated enactment of 
the one-year bar.170 
Immigration judges can also protect the legitimate government 
interest of preventing fraud in the asylum system. Specifically, lodging 
asylum applications would not remove an immigration judge’s power 
to dismiss fraudulent cases. Furthermore, because lodging is a form of 
constructive filing, it would be reviewable by the immigration judge 
whenever the applicant submits an I-589.171 Assuming there was a 
 
 169. See generally 8 C.F.R. §	208.30 (2015) (outlining the procedural and substantive 
aspects of a credible fear of persecution determination). 
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significant delay in filing after the application is lodged, the judge 
could still find that the delay was due to the applicant’s actions. Then, 
the burden of proof would be back on the applicant to show that the 
applicant qualifies for an exception to the one-year requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
While enacted as a means to decrease fraud in the immigration 
system, the one-year bar is now an unforgiving barrier to meritorious 
asylum claims, especially those of illegal entrants. When the typical 
illegal entrant asylum applicant leaves the immigration office, he 
leaves with a piece of paper that essentially says: “Hearing Time and 
Place: To Be Determined.” For some applicants, this promise is never 
fulfilled. Due to various challenges, they may never have his claim 
heard on the merits. Specifically, the number of instances where 
immigration officers have failed to schedule hearings is alarming, and 
the abandonment of certified mail as the standard for service makes it 
far less likely that asylum applicants actually know when and where to 
go plead their case. Moreover, even though the credible fear 
interview seemingly signals the start of the asylum process, asylum 
applications are not considered filed for the purposes of the one-year 
deadline until they are presented in open court at the proper 
immigration office.  
In light of these obstacles, the vulnerability of those that must 
overcome them, and the humanitarian purpose of asylum, it is clear 
that our nation’s asylum laws need improvement. Despite its harsh 
effect in many cases, outright removal of the one-year bar may not be 
the ideal solution because the bar does control the docket of an 
overburdened immigration system. Moreover, a full repeal would 
likely be politically infeasible. Permitting judicial review of timeliness 
is also an imperfect solution. While doing so would allow applicants 
another avenue for relief, it would also likely transfer some of the 
immigration court case load into the federal court system. Likewise, 
requiring certified mail for effective service could reduce the number 
of cases where an applicant is unaware of her hearing date and 
location, but it could also cause delays. 172  
No solution is perfect when there are so many competing 
interests. Nonetheless, allowing successful credible fear interviews to 
count as filing for the purposes of the one-year bar best addresses the 
problems detailed in this Recent Development. This solution shelters 
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deserving applicants from procedural penalties but also recognizes 
that there are limits to what the immigration system can and should 
handle. Although recent world events may call into question the 
wisdom of admitting immigrants from violent or war-torn foreign 
areas, it is precisely in these times that the pursuit of humanitarian 
interests is most important. Our (perhaps not so) credible fear of 
outsiders should not prevent us from helping those that truly suffer 
from the threat of persecution. After all, many American settlers 
could have been considered refugees themselves.173 By amending our 
immigration laws in measured and balanced ways to give deserving 
applicants a fair shake at a brighter future, we can help mitigate the 
devastating effects of oppression and persecution while also serving 
our national interests. 
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